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NATO’s presence in the Baltic states – reassurance for its 
allies or deterrence for Russia? 
Justyna Gotkowska in co-operation with Piotr Szymański
In late March and early April, the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) held an exercise in Estonia, 
during which US F-16s destroyed ground targets in an Estonian firing range. Around the same 
time the Americans held a drill with the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces over the Baltic Sea. The 
United States has been playing a leading role in the process of strengthening NATO’s presence 
in the Baltic states. As far as the Western European allies are concerned, Germany will follow 
in the footsteps of Denmark and the United Kingdom, both of which made significant military 
contributions to the strengthening of the allied presence in 2014, and will deploy the largest 
number of troops in 2015. Non-aligned Sweden and Finland, key for the performance of NATO 
operations in the Baltic states, have been emphasising their military and political readiness to 
co-operate with NATO in the event of potential crises or conflicts. Comparing NATO ‘s milita-
ry presence in the Baltic states before and after the outbreak of the Russian intervention in 
Ukraine, it is clear that NATO has stepped up its engagement considerably. However, its scope 
is still relatively small, given the much larger military potential and mobilisation capacity of 
Russia. Moreover, the message sent by NATO’s actions may be diminished by the political, mi-
litary and financial constraints faced by the allies and Sweden and Finland. It seems that the 
greatest risk to the military security of the Baltic states currently appears to be the possibility 
that Russia could wrongly assess the reliability of NATO’s security guarantees. 
2014: Support for the Baltic states since 
the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine
Responding to growing concern in the countries 
of NATO’s eastern flank (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and Bulgaria) about Russia’s in-
tervention in Ukraine, NATO and the individual al-
lies had decided to step up their military presence 
in the Baltic states in spring 2014, among others. 
NATO mostly intensified ongoing activities in Lith-
uania, Latvia, Estonia and the Baltic Sea region by 
strengthening of air and sea surveillance in the 
Baltic states (increase in the number of fighters as 
part of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing (BAP) mission, 
and reactivation of the ‘sleeping’ Standing NATO 
Mine Counter-Measures Group 1). 
The United States played a leading role in those 
efforts: as part of the Operation Atlantic Re-
solve, it increased the number of US fighters 
participating in the BAP mission (from 4 to 10 
in March-April 2014); established a rotating 
presence of a company-sized contingent (ca. 
150 soldiers per country), and stepped up its 
involvement in pre-scheduled military exercises 
(in which around 1700 US soldiers took part in 
2014)1. While the US has stepped aside to al-
low Germany to handle the efforts in finding 
a political resolution to the conflict in Ukraine, 
1 U.S. European Command, Fact Sheet: Operation Atlantic 
Resolve, 26 June 2014, http://www.defense.gov/home/
features/2014/0514_atlanticresolve/FactSheet_Opera-
tionAtlanticResolve_3Jul14.pdf 
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it has shaped the reinforcement of the NATO 
presence in the Baltic states through bilateral 
actions. Among the European NATO members, 
the USA’s closest allies in Europe, i.e. Denmark 
and the United Kingdom, were the first to 
step up their military involvement in the Baltic 
states. They contributed the largest numbers of 
troops to the military exercises in 2014 (around 
1200 in the case of Denmark and around 800 
in the case of the UK), and quickly deployed 
additional fighters to boost the BAP mission 
(May-August 2014). The contributions of the 
Visegrad countries, Canada, Norway and Ger-
many to the military drills in Lithuania, Latvia 
and Estonia ranged between 100–250 troops 
(e.g. Hungary deployed an infantry company 
for one month), while other allies were involved 
on a smaller scale. The reactions of Denmark 
and the UK could be explained by the fact that 
the two countries share the USA’s assessment 
of Russia’s actions in Ukraine and their conse-
quences for NATO, co-ordinate their steps with 
the USA and were able to mount a quick politi-
cal and military response in the face of a chang-
ing security environment. Moreover, Denmark 
considers itself responsible for the Baltic states 
in a way, having advocated their accession to 
NATO in the 1990s. The Danes are also aware 
that the functionality, cohesion and credibility 
of military and political alliances (NATO and the 
EU) is a guarantee of security and prosperity for 
the small states, and the Danish leadership’s in-
tention is to actively contribute to safeguarding 
it. The Danish involvement also demonstrated 
the ability of the Danish Armed Forces to quick-
ly respond militarily to unexpected regional or 
global crises. The United Kingdom, on the oth-
er hand, has been the only large EU and NATO 
member state in recent years to build up politi-
cal, economic and military links with the coun-
tries of the Nordic-Baltic region, seeing this as 
a response to Russia’s increasingly aggressive 
policy, among other issues. The large British 
involvement in the exercises shows that the 
United Kingdom is ready to assume more re-
sponsibility for buttressing the Alliance’s cred-
ibility and ensuring the security guarantees on 
NATO’s eastern flank. 
2015: Who is ready to keep supporting 
the Baltic states?
The NATO summit in Newport (September 
2014) ended with the adoption of a Readiness 
Action Plan providing for a number of NATO 
actions in the countries of the eastern flank. 
Details of those tasks were agreed during 
a meeting of NATO defence ministers in Febru-
ary 20152. From the point of view of the Baltic 
states, the most important conclusions at the 
summit included the following decisions: to cre-
ate the so-called NATO spearhead force (VJTF)3; 
to establish the NATO Force Integration Units 
(NFIU) to co-ordinate the activities of allied forc-
es in the countries in question; to develop mil-
itary infrastructure and to preposition military 
equipment; and to assure a permanent rotating 
presence of allied forces. The NFIU commands 
in Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn will probably become 
operational in June, and officers from the allied 
states will account for half of their personnel. 
The US Army Europe (USAREUR) has already 
started implementing the provisions on the 
prepositioning of military equipment. The com-
2 North Atlantic Council, Wales Summit Declaration, 
5 September 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/
official_texts_112964.htm; North Atlantic Council, De-
fence Ministers Meetings, 5 February 2015, http://nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/news_116569.htm 
3 A land brigade with maritime and air support compo-
nents, created on the basis of a part of the NATO Re-
sponse Force (around 5000 troops).
Among the European NATO members, the 
USA’s closest allies in Europe, i.e. Den-
mark and the United Kingdom, were the 
first to step up their military involvement 
in the Baltic states.
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mander of USAREUR, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, has 
declared that in each Baltic state, the equipment 
for a company or battalion-size unit would be 
stored4. This will be deployed by the end of 2015 
(as part of the equipment prepositioning for one 
US brigade combat team in Europe). However, 
most of the approximately 220 heavy vehicles of 
different types (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, 
armoured personnel carriers) will be located 
in the Grafenwöhr base in Bavaria, Germany5.
In 2015, the USA is still maintaining its rotation-
al military presence in the Baltic states. Other 
allies have also declared that they would par-
ticipate in three-monthly rotations: so far, such 
declarations have come from Portugal (one 
company between April and June in Lithuania) 
and Germany (one company between April 
and July in Lithuania, one company between 
August and November in Latvia). As for allied 
participation in military exercises in the Baltic 
states in 2015, the United States will probably 
again contribute the largest numbers of troops 
and military equipment. The USA has pledged 
to contribute a rotation of one brigade combat 
team, i.e. 3000 soldiers, to the military drills 
4 John Vandiver, Michael Darnell, ‘Army looking to store 
tanks, equipment in eastern Europe’, Stars and Stripes, 
25 January 2015, http://www.stripes.com/news/ar-
my-looking-to-store-tanks-equipment-in-eastern-eu-
rope-1.325693 
5 The USA has also been investing in the development of 
military infrastructures on the NATO’s eastern flank. In 
2015 the US Defence Department allocated US$18.4 mil-
lion for the expansion of airfields in the Baltic states, 
Romania and Bulgaria. European Reassurance Initiative: 
Fiscal Year 2016, 26 January 2015, http://comptroller.
defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/
FY2016_ERI_J-Book.pdf 
on the eastern flank (March-June 2015)6. The 
US military presence has been widely publi-
cised, as was the case with the participation of 
US soldiers in the military parade to celebrate 
Independence Day in Narva, Estonia, and the 
so-called Dragoon Ride, i.e. the convoy of sev-
eral dozen Stryker armoured fighting vehicles 
moving from the Baltic states to Germany (the 
return of the rotating company-sized units to 
the base in Vilseck, Bavaria)7. Such actions are 
intended to demonstrate to both the allies and 
Russia that the United States are still present 
in Europe and take their commitments seri-
ously. Among the European NATO members, 
in 2015 Germany has pledged the largest con-
tribution to the strengthening of the eastern 
flank, including the Baltic states. In 2015 Ger-
many is also the framework nation of the in-
terim  ‘spearhead force’8. which however will 
not conduct drills in the Baltic states this year 
(part of the ‘spearhead force’ will hold its exer-
cises in Poland in June). Germany will also send 
around 5200 troops to military exercises in the 
region, including Lithuania, Latvia and Esto-
nia9. A German contribution of this size marks 
a considerable change, compared to the small 
German military presence in the Baltic states in 
6 ‘US delivers military equipment for Baltics to Riga port; 
3000 troops to follow’, SARGS, 10 March 2015, http://
www.sargs.lv/Zinas/Military_News/2015/03/10-01.aspx-
#lastcomment 
7 John Vandiver, ‘Dragoon Ride will send US troops 
through eastern Europe in show of support’, Stars and 
Stripes, 12 March 2015, http://www.stripes.com/news/
dragoon-ride-will-send-us-troops-through-eastern-eu-
rope-in-show-of-support-1.334021 
8 The headquarters of the 1st German-Netherlands Corps 
in Münster, Germany, is in charge of commanding the 
land component of the ‘spearhead force’ (VJTF). A Ger-
man mechanised infantry battalion (around 900 troops), 
along with the Norwegian Telemark battalion and 
a Dutch battalion, constitutes the core of the combat 
force of the land part of the ‘spearhead force’. 
9 In 2015, Germany takes part in the following exercises 
in the Baltic states: Summer Shield XII (Latvia, 50), Sill 
(Estonia, 80), Sabre Strike (600, mostly in Poland), Iron 
Wolf (Lithuania, 400), Silver Arrow (Latvia, 250) and Iron 
Sword (Lithuania, 150). See Thomas Wiegold, ‘5200 deut-




The US military presence has been wide-
ly publicised. Such actions are intended to 
demonstrate to both the allies and Russia 
that the United States are still present in Eu-
rope and take their commitments seriously.
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2014 and in previous years. From the German 
point of view, its large involvement on the east-
ern flank is intended to boost Germany’s cred-
ibility as an ally and expand the political room 
for manoeuvre within NATO, should it wish to 
propose possible initiatives of dialogue with 
Russia, according to German analysts10. 
The United Kingdom has again pledged a ma-
jor contribution to the strengthening of NATO’s 
military presence on the eastern flank. In to-
tal, it will send around 4000 soldiers, some of 
whom will take part in exercises in the Baltic 
states11. The UK has also declared that British 
staff of the Headquarters of the Allied Rapid 
Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC) will take part in drills 
in Lithuania and Latvia in November. HQ ARRC 
is taking over the command of the ‘spearhead 
force’ in 2017 (the UK will be the framework 
nation at that time)12. According to available re-
ports, the other allies will contribute between 
50 and 150 troops per state (including Cana-
da and Belgium). Of the larger European allies, 
France is playing a minor role in these efforts 
in 2014; in 2015 it will also probably make only 
a small contribution to the military exercises in 
the Baltic states13.
10 Claudja Major, Christian Mölling, ‘Not a hegemon, but 
the backbone: Germany takes a leading role in NATO’s 
strategic adaptation’, European Leadership Network, 




11 Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, ‘UK con-
firms lead role in NATO spearhead force’, 6 February 
2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-con-
firms-lead-role-in-nato-spearhead-force 
12 Ministry of Defence of Lithuania, ‘Elements of the most 
capable headquarters corps of the United Kingdom 
will for the first time be deployed in Lithuania and Lat-





13 In 2014 French fighters participated in the strengthen-
ing of the BAP mission (4 Rafale/Mirage 2000 fighters 
operated from the Malbork airbase between May and 
August). The French land forces were represented by 
a cyber-defence team (over a dozen soliders) in the Spring 
Storm exercise in Estonia. The French navy took part in two 
navy drills on the Baltic, BALTOPS and Open Spirit.
The role of non-aligned Sweden and 
Finland in the allied support for the 
Baltic states
Because of their geographic locations, Sweden 
and Finland, which are not NATO members, are 
both important for the planning and conduct-
ing of NATO operations in the event of conflicts 
or crises in the Baltic states. The political and 
military reactions of these two countries to 
the increased allied presence and the extent to 
which they are willing to co-operate with NATO 
and the United States in the Baltic Sea region 
are therefore crucial. In the years 2014–2015, 
Sweden and Finland continued their involve-
ment in regular military exercises in the region 
either with the other Nordic states or with 
NATO14. Moreover, both states started devel-
oping new forms of Finnish-Swedish and Nor-
dic co-operation, as well as co-operation with 
NATO, which have provoked official discontent 
in Russia. Within NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
programme, the Swedish and Finnish air forc-
es (JAS 39 Gripen and F-18 Hornet jet fighters) 
took part in the regular Baltic Region Training 
Event (BRTE) in the Baltic states’ air space both 
in 2014 and 2015. In 2015 both countries start-
ed a series of drills with the air forces of the 
NATO members temporarily present in the Bal-
14 In 2015 Finland took/will take part in the BRTE XX (April) 
and in Sabre Strike (June). In 2014, the Finnish Armed 
Forces took part in the Sabre Strike, BRTE XIX, XVIII, XVII 
and BALTOPS exercises. The Swedish Armed Forces took 
part in BRTE XX, XIX, XVIII, XVII, as well as Open Spirit 
and BALTOPS.
The reaction of Sweden and Finland to the 
increased allied presence and the extent to 
which both countries are willing to co-op-
erate with NATO and the USA in the Baltic 
Sea region are crucial to the security of the 
Baltic states.
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tic states (the so-called Finland-Sweden Train-
ing Event, FSTE)15. The exercises took part in 
Swedish, Finnish and international air space 
over the Baltic Sea. The first drill of this series, 
held in late March 2015, involved the Swedes 
and the Finns alongside the USA16. Moreover, 
in May 2015 Sweden and Finland together with 
Norway co-organise and participate in the larg-
est air force exercises in Europe this year, the 
Arctic Challenge Exercise (ACE 2015, with over 
100 aircraft) in the northern regions of Norway, 
Sweden and Finland, with a large participation 
from other countries, including the USA, France 
and Germany17. 
The fact that Sweden and Finland have main-
tained their previous level of involvement, and 
even expanded participation, in military exer-
cises in the Nordic-Baltic region demonstrates 
that they are ready to co-operate with NATO 
militarily in the face of adverse developments 
in the regional security environment, which is 
a clear signal to Russia. The two states have also 
demonstrated their political will to co-operate in 
the Nordic-Baltic region. The widely-comment-
ed joint article by the five Nordic ministers (of 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland) 
entitled ‘We must be ready for emerging crises’ 
15 Stefan Kaarle, ‘Med våra närmaste grannar’, Flygvapen-
bloggen (official blog of the Swedish Air Force), 14 April 
2015, http://blogg.forsvarsmakten.se/flygvapenbloggen/ 
16 14 US F-16 fighters from the 510th Fighter Squadron based 
in Aviano operated from the air base in Ämari, Estonia. The 
Swedish and Finnish Air Forces contributed 8 JAS 39 Gripen 
fighers and 4 F-18 Hornet fighters respectively. 
17 Norwegian Armed Forces, Arctic Challenge Exercise 
2015, updated on 22 April 2015, https://forsvaret.no/
ace, Trude Pettersen, ‘Update: Large air force drill in the 
Barents Region’, BarentsObserver, 4 March 2015, http://
barentsobserver.com/en/security/2015/03/update-large-
air-force-drill-barents-region-04-03 
(9 April 2015) sent a clear message to Russia18. 
It emphasised that in view of the rising uncer-
tainty in the Baltic Sea region, the Nordic states 
would act in solidarity, and also extend that sol-
idarity to the Baltic states. This attitude by Swe-
den and Finland (in political and military terms) 
is immensely important because of the Russian 
disinformation campaigns aimed at discrediting 
the two states as reliable partners for NATO.
Conclusions – reassurance for the allies, 
or deterrence for Russia? 
The current allied activity in the Baltic states 
is the outcome of a compromise concluded at 
the NATO summit in Newport, where the allies 
discussed the status of NATO-Russia relations 
and the form of allied presence on the eastern 
flank in view of Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
and intervention in eastern Ukraine, as well as 
Moscow’s anti-Western rhetoric and provoca-
tive actions in the Baltic Sea region. Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia were in the group of states 
calling for the NATO-Russia agreements of 
1997 and 200219 to be deemed no longer bind-
ing in view of Russia’s violations of their provi-
sions. Politically, this would entail a change of 
Russia’s status in its relations with NATO – the 
country would officially cease to be treated as 
NATO’s partner (Russia itself views NATO and 
the USA as opponents, and for years has been 
conducting military drills with offensive scenar-
ios against NATO states). In the military dimen-
sion, such a decision would pave the way for 
the permanent deployment of significant NATO 
forces on the eastern flank. From the Baltic 
states’ point of view, it would have constituted 
a clear confirmation of the collective defence 
18 Ine Eriksen Søreide, Nicolai Wammen, Carl Haglund, Gun-
nar Bragi, Peter Hultqvist, ‘Vi må være forberedt på at kri-




19 See the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, op. cit., and the 
2002 Rome declaration ‘NATO–Russia relations: A new quality’, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/ar/natohq/official_texts_19572.htm
The current allied activity in the Baltic states 
is the outcome of a compromise concluded 
at the NATO summit in Newport.
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guarantees and sent a clear deterrent signal. 
However, the Western European allies under 
the leadership of Germany refused a change 
to Russia’s status and to the formula of NATO’s 
presence in the countries of the eastern flank, 
although they did recognise the need to boost 
their security. The underlying reason was an un-
willingness to escalate tensions between NATO 
and Russia. The compromise reached stated 
that the Alliance would continue to unilateral-
ly abide by the NATO-Russia agreements, but 
at the same time it would step up its involve-
ment on the eastern flank (by ensuring a ro-
tating and continuous presence of allied forces, 
greater involvement in military exercises, prep-
ositioning of military equipment and devel-
opment of military infrastructures) and adapt 
to new challenges in collective defence (by 
forming the ‘spearhead force’ and increasing 
the readiness level of the Multinational Corps 
Northeast in Stettin and extending its tasks). 
Comparing the allied presence in the Baltic states 
before and after the outbreak of the conflict in 
Ukraine, it is clear that NATO’s involvement has 
increased considerably. However, in quantita-
tive terms it is relatively low, especially given the 
much larger military potential and mobilisation 
capacity of Russia. Moreover, the message of 
NATO’s actions may be diminished by the polit-
ical, military and financial constraints faced by 
the allies as well as Finland and Sweden. (1) For 
the USA, the strategy of strengthening NA-
TO’s eastern flank is an attempt to reconcile 
several contradictory objectives of US policy. 
On the one hand, the USA deems it necessary 
to reassure the allies in Europe, and especial-
ly the Baltic states. On the other, Washington 
is set to continue rebalancing its engagement 
and building up its position in the Asia Pacif-
ic region, and Europe will remain just one of 
several theatres of action. Because of US bud-
getary constraints and the US administration’s 
reluctance to excessively escalate tensions with 
Russia (as clearly visible in its rather cautious 
direct support for Ukraine), the US presence 
in the Baltic states is and will probably remain 
limited to a relatively small force (even though 
the USA is still the largest military contributor 
of all the NATO members). However, this will be 
widely publicised to demonstrate that the Unit-
ed States treats security guarantees to its allies 
seriously. In this context it should be noted that 
the Americans expect Europe to become more 
involved in ensuring security in the Baltic Sea 
region. (2) For this reason, the scale and sus-
tained nature of the European contribution 
to strengthening NATO’s eastern flank, as 
well as the political and military credibility of 
the Western European allies, will be crucial. Fol-
lowing the major contributions of the United 
Kingdom and Denmark to the exercises in 2014, 
and of Germany in 2015, the question of the 
involvement of Western European states in the 
future arises. The underfinancing of the West-
ern European armed forces will limit the abili-
ty to develop sustainable military capabilities, 
and may affect the ability to continuously take 
part in military exercises on the eastern flank. 
Insufficient defence spending may be seen as 
a factor undermining the credibility of an ad-
equate reaction in the event of conflicts in the 
region20. According to SIPRI statistics, the crisis 
in Ukraine triggered a spike in defence spend-
ing in 2014 in the NATO states bordering Rus-
sia, but not in those in Western Europe, where 
defence budgets have continued to stagnate 
or decrease (France, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Italy, Spain). Only small increases in 
20 Sam Perlo-Freeman, Aude Fleurant, Pieter D. Wezeman, 
Siemon T. Wezeman, Trends in world military expendi-
ture 2014, SIPRI Fact Sheet, http://books.sipri.org/prod-
uct_info?c_product_id=496
If Russia views NATO’s actions as a sign 
of weakness and divisions, rather than as 
a manifestation of strength underpinned 
by a well-considered strategy, this may 
encourage Moscow to test the cohesion 
and credibility of NATO in the future.
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some of the Western European countries are 
planned in the years to come. Moreover, the al-
lies’ disparate perceptions of and reactions to 
the Russian intervention in Ukraine may pose 
questions about the political will within NATO 
to acknowledge a potential Russian aggression 
in the event of hybrid threats and to invoke 
Article 5. (3) The readiness that Sweden and 
Finland have been demonstrating to co-op-
erate with NATO in the region (which, how-
ever, does not extend to active involvement in 
a potential allied operation to defend the Bal-
tics) may be mitigated by political and military 
limitations. The relatively underfinanced Swed-
ish Armed Forces, which in recent years have 
been focused on developing their expedition-
ary capabilities, are less capable to defend their 
own territory, and could face difficulties if Swe-
den becomes involved in a protracted operation 
in the region. In Finland, the Swedish-Finnish 
air force exercise with the United States and the 
joint article by the Nordic ministers provoked
internal political controversies, although the 
pre-election context also played a role there21. 
The political, military and economic pressure 
from Russia, with which Finland shares a long 
land border and has extensive economic co-op-
eration, may reduce the scope of Finland’s 
co-operation with NATO in the event of a crisis 
or conflict in the region.
However, the key factor is the Russian percep-
tion of NATO’s activities and the credibility of 
the Alliance’s security guarantees for the Bal-
tic states. If Russia views NATO’s actions as 
a sign of weakness and divisions, rather than 
as a manifestation of strength underpinned by 
a well-considered strategy, this may encourage 
Moscow to test the cohesion and credibility of 
NATO in the future. It is in the interest of NATO 
as a whole to make sure that the reinforcement 
of the allied presence on the eastern flank is not 
seen as a lukewarm policy to reassure the Bal-
tic states, but as a credible policy of deterrence 
vis-à-vis Russia.
21 The parliamentary elections in Finland took place on 19 April 
2015. Prime Minister Alexander Stubb and defence minis-
ter Carl Haglund reportedly responded positively to the US 
invitation to take part in an air force exercise involving the 
USA, while President Sauli Niinistö and foreign minister Erkki 
Tuomioja were against Finnish involvement. See ‘High level 
discord over US-Finnish air force exercises’, YLE, 18 Janu-
ary 2015, http://yle.fi/uutiset/hs_high_level_discord_over_
us-finnish_air_force_exercises/7744391. In the wake of the 
joint article by the Nordic ministers, President Sauli Niinistö 
found it necessary to declare that Nordic co-operation was 
not directed against anyone. Foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja 
described the declaration as “slightly misleading” because 
Finland had no hostile intentions. See: ‘Debattartikel om för-
svar ifrågasätts’, Svenska Dagbladet, 14 April 2015, http://
www.svd.se/nyheter/utrikes/debattartikel-om-forsvar-ifra-
gasatts_4481937.svd 
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APPENDIX 1
Selected military exercises in the Baltic states in the years 2013–2015 
Codename Sabre Strike 2013 Sabre Strike 2014 Sabre Strike 2015
Location and date Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
3–14 June
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,  
9–20 June
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
Poland 8–20 June
Host and scenario USA
  host nation support, de-
fence of national territory
USA
 host nation support, defence of 
national territory
USA
 host nation support, de-
fence of national territory



























United Kingdom – 120 
(estimated)
Lithuania – no data
Latvia – no data
Estonia – no data
Dania – no data
Finland – no data
Codename Spring Storm 2013 Spring Storm 2014
(Steadfast Javelin 1)  
Spring Storm 2015
(Siil 2015)
Location and date Estonia, 9–25 May Estonia, 5–23 May Estonia, 4–15 May
Host and scenario Estonia
largest annual military 
exercise of the Estonian 
Armed Forces; command at 
battalion level, final exam 
for conscripts
Estonia and NATO
largest annual military exercise 
of the Estonian Armed Forces; 
command at battalion level, 
repulsion of an attack on Estonia 
(Steadfast Javelin), final exam for 
conscripts
Estonia and NATO
largest annual military 
exercise of the Estonian 
Armed Forces; test of com-
bat readiness of the armed 
forces in the whole country, 
mobilisation of reservists 
(around 7000), command 
at brigade level, final exam 
for conscripts 









United Kingdom – 100
Latvia – 100 
Lithuania – 30 
Belgium – 10 
France – 10
USA – 120
United Kingdom – 100
Germany – 80
Latvia – no data 
Belgium – no data
Netherlands – no data
Codename Summer Shield X Summer Shield XI Summer Shield XII 
Location and date Latvia, 15–26 April 2013 Latvia, 7–17 April 2014 Latvia, 22–31 March 2015
Host and scenario Latvia and USA,
integration of combat 
support elements in various 
infantry operations
Latvia and USA, 
 improving combat support ca-
pabilities and cooperation with 
other units of armed forces
NATO, a combined land, air 
and naval exercise, integra-
tion and coordination of 
fire support in infantry unit 
operations





Estonia – as observer











Canada – 45 
Luxembourg – 18
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Strengthened Baltic Air Policing mission 2014–2015
Rotation State (airbase)/ fighters
September-December
2015
Hungary (Šiauliai) 4 × JAS 39 Gripen
no data (Šiauliai)




Norway (Šiauliai) 4 × F-16
Italy (Šiauliai) 4 × Eurofighter
United Kingdom (Ämari) 4 × Eurofighter
Belgium (Malbork) 4 × F-16
January-April
2015
Italy (Šiauliai) 4 × Eurofighter
Poland (Šiauliai) 4 × MiG 29
Spain (Ämari) 4 × Eurofighter
Belgium (Malbork) 4 × F-16
September-December
2014
Portugal (Šiauliai) 4 × F-16
Canada (Šiauliai) 4 × CF-18 Hornet
Germany (Ämari) 4 × Eurofighter
Netherlands (Malbork) 4 × F-16
May-August
2014
Poland (Šiauliai) 4 × MiG 29
United Kingdom (Šiauliai) 4 × Eurofighter
Denmark (Ämari) 4 × F-16
France (Malbork) 4 × Rafale/Mirage 2000
January-April
2014
USA (Šiauliai) increased from 4 to
10 × F-15 in March 2014
Before March 2014, the Baltic Air Policing mission involved 4 fighters based in Šiauliai. The current 
number of 16 fighters, operating from the bases in Siauliai, Ämari and Malbork, will be maintained 
at least until the end of 2015.
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